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Abstract
The paper presents a constructive 3-valued se-
mantics for autoepistemic logic (AEL). We in-
troduce a derivation operator and define the se-
mantics as its least fixpoint. The semantics is 3-
valued in the sense that, for some formulas, the
least fixpoint does not specify whether they are
believed or not. We show that complete fixpoints
of the derivation operator correspond to Moore’s
stable expansions. In the case of modal represen-
tations of logic programs our least fixpoint seman-
tics expresses well-founded semantics or 3-valued
Fitting-Kunen semantics (depending on the em-
bedding used). We show that, computationally,
our semantics is simpler than the semantics pro-
posed by Moore (assuming that the polynomial
hierarchy does not collapse).
Introduction
We describe a 3-valued semantics for modal theories
that approximates skeptical mode of reasoning in the
autoepistemic logic introduced in (?; ?). We present
results demonstrating that our approach is, indeed, ap-
propriate for modeling autoepistemic reasoning. We
discuss computational properties of our semantics and
connections to logic programming.
Autoepistemic logic is among the most extensively
studied nonmonotonic formal systems. It is closely re-
lated to default logic (?). It can handle default rea-
sonings under a simple and modular translation in the
case of prerequisite-free defaults (?). In the case of arbi-
trary default theories, a somewhat more complex non-
modular translation provides a one-to-one correspon-
dence between default extensions and stable (autoepis-
temic) expansions (?). Further, under the so called
Gelfond translation, autoepistemic logic captures the
semantics of stable models for logic programs (?). Un-
der the Konolige encoding of logic programs as modal
theories, stable expansions generalize the concept of the
supported model semantics (?). Autoepistemic logic is
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also known to be equivalent to several other modal non-
monotonic reasoning systems.
The semantics for autoepistemic logic (?) assigns to
a modal theory T a collection of its stable expansions.
This collection may be empty, may consist of exactly
one expansion or may consist of several different ex-
pansions. Intuitively, expansions are designed to model
belief states of agents with perfect introspection powers:
for every formula F , either the formula KF (expressing
a belief in F ) or the formula ¬KF (expressing that F
is not believed) belongs to an expansion. We will say
that expansions contain no meta-ignorance.
In many applications, the phenomenon of multiple
expansions is desirable. There are situations where
we are not interested in answers to queries concern-
ing a single atom or formula, but in a collection of
atoms or formulas that satisfy some constraints. Plan-
ning and diagnosis in artificial intelligence, and a range
of combinatorial optimization problems, such as com-
puting hamilton cycles or k-colorings in graphs, are of
this type. These problems may be solved by means
of autoepistemic logic precisely due to the fact that
multiple expansions are possible. The idea is to rep-
resent a problem as an autoepistemic theory so that
solutions to the problem are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with stable expansions. While conceptually el-
egant, this approach has its problems. Determining
whether expansions exist is a ΣP2 -complete problem (?;
?), and all known algorithms for computing expansions
are highly inefficient.
In a more standard setting of knowledge representa-
tion, the goal is to model the knowledge about a do-
main as a theory in some formal system and, then, to
use some inference mechanism to resolve queries against
the theory or, in other words, establish whether particu-
lar formulas are entailed by this theory. Autoepistemic
logic (as well as other nonmonotonic systems) can be
used in this mode, too. Namely, under the so called
skeptical model, a formula is entailed by a modal the-
ory, if it belongs to all stable expansions of this theory.
The problem is, again, with the computational com-
plexity of determining whether a formula belongs to all
expansions.
We propose an alternative semantics for autoepis-
temic reasoning that allows us to approximate the skep-
tical approach described above. Our semantics has the
property that if it assigns to a formula the truth value t,
then this formula belongs to all stable expansions and,
dually, if it assigns to a formula the truth value f, then
this formula does not belong to any expansion. Our se-
mantics is 3-valued and some formulas are assigned the
truth value u (unknown). While only approximating
the skeptical mode of reasoning, it has one important
advantage. Its computational complexity is lower (as-
suming that the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse
on some low level). Namely, the problem to determine
the truth value of a formula is in the class ∆P2 .
Clearly, the semantics we propose can be applied
whenever the situation requires that autoepistemic logic
be used in the skeptical mode. However, it has also an-
other important application. It can be used as a prun-
ing mechanism in algorithms that compute expansions.
The idea is to first compute our 3-valued interpretation
for an autoepistemic theory (which is computationally
simpler than the task of computing an expansion) and,
in this way, find some formulas which are in all expan-
sions and some that are in none. This restricts the
search space for expansions and may yield significant
speedups.
Conceptually, our semantics plays the role similar
to that played by the well-founded semantics in logic
programming. Deciding whether an atom is in all sta-
ble models is a co-NP-complete problem. However, the
well-founded semantics, which approximates the stable
model semantics can be computed in polynomial time.
Furthermore, well-founded semantics is used both as
the basis for top-down query answering implementa-
tions of logic programming (?), and as a search space
pruning mechanism by some implementations to com-
pute stable model semantics (?).
Our 3-valued semantics for autoepistemic logic is
based on the notion of a belief pair. These are pairs
(P, S), where P and S are sets of 2-valued interpreta-
tions of the underlying first-order language, and S ⊆ P .
The motivation to consider belief pairs comes from
Moore’s possible-world characterization of stable ex-
pansions (?). Moore characterized consistent expan-
sions in terms of possible-world structures, that is, non-
empty sets of 2-valued interpretations. A belief pair
(P, S) can be viewed as an approximation to a possible-
world structure W such that S ⊆ W ⊆ P : interpreta-
tions not in P are known not to be inW , and those in S
are known to be in W . Observe that while expansions
(or the corresponding possible-world structures) do not
contain meta-ignorance, belief pairs, in general, do.
Our semantics is defined in terms of fixpoints of a
monotone operator defined on the set of belief pairs.
This operator, DT , is determined by an initial theory
T . Given a belief pair B = (P, S), DT establishes that
some interpretations that are in P must, in fact, belong
to S. In addition, some other interpretations in P are
eliminated altogether, as inappropriate for describing
a possible state of the world (given the agent’s initial
knowledge). The operator attempts to simulate a con-
structive process rational agents might use to produce
an “elementary” improvement on their current set of
beliefs and disbeliefs.
We say that (P1, S1) “better approximates” the
agent’s beliefs and disbeliefs entailed by the agent’s ini-
tial assumptions than (P, S) if S ⊆ S1 ⊆ P1 ⊆ P. The
operator DT is monotone with respect to this ordering
and, thus, it has the least fixpoint. We propose this fix-
point as a constructive approximation to the semantics
of stable expansions.
A fundamental property that makes the above con-
struction meaningful is that complete belief pairs (those
with P equal to S) that are fixpoints of D are precisely
Moore’s S5-models characterizing expansions. Thus, by
the general properties of fixpoints of monotone opera-
tors over partially ordered sets, the least fixpoint de-
scribed above indeed approximates the skeptical rea-
soning based on expansions. Moreover, as mentioned
above, the problem of computing the least fixpoint of
the operatorD requires only polynomially many calls to
the satisfiability testing engine, that is, it is in ∆P2 . An-
other property substantiating our approach is that un-
der some natural encodings of logic programs as modal
theories, our semantics yields both well-founded seman-
tics (?) and the 3-valued Fitting-Kunen semantics (?;
?).
Autoepistemic logic — preliminaries
The language of autoepistemic logic is the standard lan-
guage of propositional modal logic over a set of atoms
Σ and with a single modal operator K. We will refer
to this language as LK . The propositional fragment of
LK will be denoted by L.
The notion of a 2-valued interpretation of the alpha-
bet Σ is defined as usual: it is a mapping from Σ to
{t, f}. The set of all interpretations of Σ is denoted AΣ
(or A, if Σ is clear from the context).
A possible-world semantics for autoepistemic logic
was introduced by Moore (?) and proven equivalent
with the semantics of stable expansions. A possible-
world structureW (over Σ) is a set of 2-valued interpre-
tations of Σ. Alternatively, it can be seen as a Kripke
structure with a total accessibility relation. Given a
pair (W, I), where W is a set of interpretations and I
is an interpretation (not necessarily from W ), one de-
fines a truth assignment function HW,I inductively as
follows:
(1) For an atom A, we define HW,I(A) = I(A);
(2) The boolean connectives are handled in the usual
way;
(3) For every formula F , we define HW,I(KF ) = t if
for every J ∈ W,HW,J(F ) = t, and HW,I(KF ) = f,
otherwise.
We write (W, I) |= F to denote that HW,I(F ) = t.
Further, for a modal theory T , we will write (W, I) |= T
if HW,I(F ) = t for any F ∈ T . Finally, for a possible
world structure W we define the theory of W , Th(W ),
by: Th(W ) = {F : (W, I) |= F, for all I ∈W}.
It is well known that for every formula F , either
KF ∈ Th(W ) or ¬KF ∈ Th(W ) (HW,I(KF ) is the
same for all interpretations I ∈ W ). Thus, possible-
world structures have no meta-ignorance and, as such,
are suitable for modeling belief sets of agents with per-
fect introspection capabilities. It is precisely this prop-
erty that made possible-world structures fundamental
objects in the study of modal nonmonotonic logics (?;
?).
Definition 1 An autoepistemic model of a modal the-
ory T is a possible-world (S5) structure W which sat-
isfies the following fixpoint equation:
W = {I: (W, I) |= T }.
The following theorem, relating stable expansions of
(?) and autoepistemic models, was proved in (?) and
was discussed in detail in (?).
Theorem 1 For any two modal theories T and E, E
is a consistent stable expansion of T if and only if E =
Th(W ) for some nonempty autoepistemic model W of
T .
A fixpoint 3-valued semantics for
autoepistemic logic
Our semantics for autoepistemic logic is defined in
terms of possible-world structures and fixpoint con-
ditions. The key difference with the semantics pro-
posed by Moore is that we consider approximations
of possible-world structures by pairs of possible-world
structures. Recall from the previous section, that A
denotes the set of all interpretations of a fixed proposi-
tional language L.
Definition 2 A belief pair is a pair (P, S) of sets of
interpretations P and S such that P ⊇ S. When
B = (P, S), S(B) denotes S and P (B) denotes P . The
belief pair (A, ∅) is denoted ⊥. The set {(P, S):P, S ∈
A and P ⊇ S} of all belief pairs is denoted by B.
The interpretations in S(B) can be viewed as states
of the world which are known to be possible (belong
to W ). They form a lower approximation to W . The
interpretations in P (B) can be viewed as an upper ap-
proximation to W . In other words, interpretations not
in P (B) are known not to be in W .
We will extend now the concept of an interpreta-
tion to the case of belief pairs and consider the ques-
tion of meta-ignorance and meta-knowledge of belief
pairs. We will show that, being only approximations
to possible-world structures, belief pairs may contain
meta-ignorance. We will use three logical values, f, u
and t. In the definition, we will use the truth ordering:
f ≤tr u ≤tr t and define f
−1 = t, t−1 = f,u−1 = u.
Definition 3 Let B = (P, S) be a belief pair and let I
be an interpretation. The truth function HB,I is defined
inductively:
HB,I(A) = I(A) (A is an atom)
HB,I(¬F ) = HB,I(F )−1
HB,I(F1 ∨ F2) = max{HB,I(F1),HB,I(F2)}
HB,I(F1 ∧ F2) = min{HB,I(F1),HB,I(F2)}
HB,I(F2 ⊃ F1) = max{HB,I(F1),HB,I(F2)−1}
The formula K(F ) is evaluated as follows:
HB,I(K(F )) =
{
t if ∀J∈PHB,J (F ) = t
f if ∃J∈SHB,J(F ) = f
u otherwise
The truth value of a modal atom KF , HB,I(KF ),
does not depend on the choice of I. Consequently, for a
modal atom KF we will write HB(KF ) to denote this,
common to all interpretations from A, truth value of
KF .
Let us define the meta-knowledge of a belief pair B
as the set of formulas F ∈ LK such that HB(KF ) = t
or HB(KF ) = f. The meta-ignorance is formed by
all other formulas, that is, those formulas F ∈ LK for
which HB(KF ) = u.
Clearly, a belief pair B = (W,W ) naturally corre-
sponds to a possible-world structure W . Such a belief
pair is called complete. We will denote it by (W ). The
following straightforward result indicates that HB,I is
a generalization of HW,I to the case of belief pairs. It
also states that a complete belief pair contains no meta-
ignorance.
Proposition 1 If B is a complete belief pair (W ),
then HB,I is 2-valued. Moreover, for every formula F ,
HB,I(F ) = HW,I(F ).
In our approach to autoepistemic reasoning we will
model the agent who, given an initial theory T ,
starts with the belief pair ⊥ (with the smallest meta-
knowledge content) and, then, iteratively constructs a
sequence of belief pairs with increasing meta-knowledge
(decreasing meta-ignorance) until no more improve-
ment is possible. To this end, we will introduce now a
partial ordering on the set B of belief pairs. Given two
belief pairs B1 and B2, we define B1 ≤p B2 if P (B1) ⊇
P (B2) and S(B1) ⊆ S(B2). This ordering is consistent
with the ordering defined by the “amount” of meta-
knowledge contained in a belief pair: the ”higher” a
belief pair in the ordering≤p, the more meta-knowledge
it contains (and the less meta-ignorance). It is also con-
sistent with the concept of the information ordering of
the truth values: u ≤kn f,u ≤kn t, f 6≤kn t and t 6≤kn f.
Proposition 2 Let B1 and B2 be belief pairs. If B1 ≤p
B2 then for every F ∈ LK and for every interpretation
I, HB1,I(F ) ≤kn HB2,I(F ).
The ordered set (B,≤p) is not a lattice. In fact, for
every W ⊆ A, (W ) is a maximal element in (B,≤p).
If W1 6= W2, then (W1) and (W2) have no least upper
bound (l.u.b.) in (B,≤p). The pair ⊥ = (A, ∅) is the
least element of (B,≤p).
The ordered set (B,≤p) is chain-complete. That is,
every set of pairwise comparable elements has the l.u.b.
A monotone operator defined on a chain-complete or-
dered set with a least element has a least fixpoint, which
is the limit of the iterations of the operator starting at
the least element ⊥ (?).
We will now define a monotone operator on the or-
dered set (B,≤p) and will use it to define a step-
wise process of constructing belief pairs with increasing
meta-knowledge. To this end, we will define two sat-
isfaction relations: weak (denoted by |=w) and strong
(denoted by |=):
(B, I) |=w F if HB,I(F ) 6= f (i.e. HB,I(F ) ≥tr u)
(B, I) |= F if HB,I(F ) = t
Definition 4 Given B ∈ B, the value of the derivation
operator DT is defined as follows:
DT (B) = ({I | B, I |=w T }, {I | B, I |= T }).
Thus, P (DT (B)) consists of the states which weakly
satisfy T , according to B, while S(DT (B)) are the states
which strongly satisfy T according to B. The subscript
T is omitted when T is clear from the context.
Example 1 Consider T = {K(p) ⊃ q}. Then D(⊥) =
(A, {pq, pq}). Indeed, H⊥(Kp) = u. Consequently,
for every I, H⊥,I(Kp ⊃ q) 6= f, that is, (⊥, I) |=w
Kp ⊃ q. For the same reason, H⊥,I(Kp ⊃ q)) = t
if and only if I(q) = t. To compute D2(⊥), ob-
serve that HD(⊥)(Kp) = f. Consequently, for every I,
HD(⊥),I(Kp ⊃ q) = t. It follows that D
2(⊥) = (A,A).
It is also easy to see now that (A,A) is the fixpoint of
D. Notice that the belief pair (A), obtained by iter-
ating D, corresponds to the possible-world structure A
that defines the unique stable expansion of T .
Basic properties of the operator D are gathered in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let T be a propositionally consistent
modal theory. Then, for every belief pair B:
(1) DT (B) is a belief pair.
(2) DT is monotone on B.
(3) If B is complete, then DT (B) is complete.
Since (B,≤p) is a chain-complete ordered set with
least element ⊥ and D is monotonic, D has a least fix-
point. We will denote it by D ↑. We propose this
fixpoint as the semantics of modal theories. This se-
mantics reflects the reasoning process of an agent who
gradually constructs belief pairs with increasing infor-
mation content. In the remainder of the paper, we will
study properties of this semantics and, more generally,
of fixpoints of the operator D. The next three results
relate fixpoints of D to Moore’s semantics.
Theorem 2 Let T ⊆ LK . A possible-world structure
W is an autoepistemic model of T if and only if (W )
is a fixpoint of DT . If DT ↑ is complete then it is the
unique autoepistemic model of T .
Using Propositions 1 and 2, we can extract a rela-
tionship between stable expansions and fixpoints of the
derivation operator DT .
Corollary 1 For any pair T,E of modal theories, E is
a consistent stable expansion of T if and only if E =
Th(S) for some complete fixpoint (S) of DT .
If HDT ↑(F ) = t then F belongs to all expansions of T .
If HDT ↑(F ) = f then F does not belong to any expansion
of T .
Consistent stratified autoepistemic theories (?) have
a unique autoepistemic model (stable expansion). Our
semantics coincides with the Moore’s semantics on
stratified theories.
Theorem 3 If T is a consistent stratified autoepis-
temic theory, then D ↑ is complete. Hence, it is the
unique autoepistemic model of T .
Thus, the semantics defined by the least fixpoint of
the operator D has several attractive features. It is de-
fined for every consistent modal theory T . It coincides
with the semantics of autoepistemic logic on stratified
theories and, in the general case, provides an approxi-
mation to all stable expansions (or, in other words, to
skeptical autoepistemic reasoning).
An effective implementation of D
The approach proposed and discussed in the previous
section does not directly yield itself to fast implemen-
tations. The definition of the operator D refers to all
interpretations of the language L. Thus, computing
D(B) by following the definition is exponential, even for
modal theories of a very simple syntactic form. More-
over, representing belief pairs is costly. Each of the
sets P (B) and S(B) may contain exponentially many
elements.
In this section, we describe a characterization of the
operator D that is much more suitable for investiga-
tions of algorithmic issues associated with our seman-
tics. The strategy is to represent a belief set B as a
theory Rep(B). Since the theory Rep(B) needs to rep-
resent two sets of valuations, Rep(B) will be a theory in
the propositional language extended by three constants
t, f and u. These constants will always be interpreted
by the logical values t, f and u, respectively. We will
call such theories 3-FOL theories.
Let F be a 3-FOL formula. By (F )wk we denote the
formula obtained by substituting t for all positive oc-
currences of u and f for all negative occurrences of u.
Similarly, by (F )str we denote the formula obtained by
substituting t for all negative occurrences of u and f
for all positive occurrences of u. Given a 3-FOL the-
ory Y , we define (Y )str and (Y )wk by standard setwise
extension.
Clearly, (F )str and (F )wk do not contain u. Conse-
quently, they can be regarded as formulas in the propo-
sitional language extended by two constants t and f
with standard interpretations as truth and falsity, re-
spectively. We will call this language 2-FOL. We will
write ⊢ and |= to denote provability and entailment re-
lations in 2-FOL. An important observation here is that
if an interpretation satisfies the formula (F )str then
it also satisfies (F )wk . That is (F )str ⊃ (F )wk is a
tautology of 2-FOL. For a 2-FOL theory U , we define:
Mod(U) = {I : for all F ∈ U, I |= F}. It follows that
for a 3-FOL theory Y , Mod((Y )str ) ⊆ Mod((Y )wk ).
Thus, (Mod((Y )wk ),Mod((Y )str ) is a belief pair and
Y can be viewed as its representation.
We show now how, similarly to belief pairs, 3-FOL
theories can be used to assign truth values to modal
atoms (and, hence, to all modal formulas). Let Y be a
3-FOL theory, and let F be a modal formula. Define
HY (K(F )) by induction of depth of formula F as fol-
lows:
(1) If F is objective, then define:
HY (K(F )) =


t if (Y )wk ⊢ (F )str
f if (Y )str 6⊢ (F )wk
u otherwise.
(2) If F is not objective, then replace all modal atoms
K(G) in F by HY (K(G)). This yields an objective for-
mula F ′. Define HY (K(F )) = HY (K(F ′)).
Let T be a modal theory and let Y be a 3-FOL theory.
By the Y -instance of T , TY , we mean a 3-FOL theory
obtained by substituting all modal literals K(F ) (not
appearing under the scope of any other occurrence of
K) by HY (K(F )). Observe that for a finite modal the-
ory T and a finite 3-FOL theory Y , TY can be computed
by means of polynomially many calls to the proposi-
tional provability procedure.
Let T be a modal theory. We will now define a coun-
terpart to the operator DT . Let Y be a 3-FOL theory.
Define SDT (Y ) = TY .
The key property of the operator SDT is that, for
a finite modal theory T and for a finite 3-FOL theory
Y , SDT (Y ) can be computed by means of polynomially
many calls to the propositional provability procedure.
We will show that SDT can be used to compute DT .
In particular, we will show that the least fixpoint of DT
can be computed by iterating the operator SDT . To
this end, for every 3-FOL theory Y , define Bel(Y ) =
(Mod((T )wk ),Mod((T )str )).
First, the following theorem shows that the truth val-
ues of modal atoms evaluated according to a 3-FOL
theory T and according to the corresponding belief pair
Bel(T ) coincide.
Theorem 4 Let Y be a 3-FOL theory. Then, for every
modal formula F ,
HBel(Y )(K(F )) = HY (K(F )).
Next, let us observe that the operator D can be de-
scribed in terms of the operator Bel. Let T be a modal
theory and let B be a belief pair. By the B-instance of
T , TB, we mean a 3-FOL theory obtained by substitut-
ing all modal literals K(F ) (not appearing under the
scope of any other occurrence of K) by HB(K(F )).
Theorem 5 Let T be a modal theory and let B be a
belief pair. Then, DT (B) = Bel(TB)
This theorem indicates that, given a modal theory T ,
belief pairs that are in the range of the operator DT can
be represented by objects of size polynomial in the size
of T . Namely, every belief pair of the form DT (B) can
be represented by a 3-FOL theory TB.
Theorems 4 and 5 imply the main result of this sec-
tion.
Theorem 6 Let T be a modal theory and let Y be a
3-FOL theory.
(1) Bel(SDT (Y )) = DT (Bel(Y )).
(2) If a belief pair B is a fixpoint of DT , then TB is a
fixpoint of SDT .
(3) If Y is a fixpoint of SDT then Bel(Y ) is a fixpoint
of DT .
Observe that Bel({u}) = ⊥. It follows directly from
Theorem 6 (by induction) that for every ordinal number
α, DαT (⊥) = Bel(SD
α
T ({u})).
Clearly, if SDαT (⊥) = SD
α+1
T (⊥) then D
α
T (⊥) =
Dα+1T (⊥). Moreover, by Theorems 4, 5 and 6, and by
induction, it is easy to show that if DαT (⊥) = D
α+1
T (⊥)
then SDα+1T (⊥) = SD
α+2
T (⊥).
Consequently, the least fixpoint of DT (its
polynomial-size representation) can be computed by it-
erating the operator SDT . In the case when T is finite,
the number of iterations is limited by the number of
top level (unnested) modal literals in T . Originally,
they may all be evaluated to u. However, at each step,
at least one u changes to either t or f and this value
is preserved in the subsequent evaluations. Thus, the
problem of computing a polynomial size representation
of the least fixpoint of the operator D, the correspond-
ing 3-FOL theory, is in the class ∆P2 .
Relationship to Logic Programming
Autoepistemic logic is closely related to several seman-
tics for logic programs with negation. It is well-known
that both stable and supported models of logic pro-
grams can be described as expansions of appropriate
translations of programs into modal theories (see, for
instance, (?)). In this section, we briefly discuss con-
nections of the semantics defined by the least point of
the operator D to some 3-valued semantics of logic pro-
grams. The details will be provided in a forthcoming
work.
Given a logic programming clause
r = a← b1, . . . , bk,not(c1), . . . ,not(cm),
define:
ael1(r) = b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bk ∧ ¬Kc1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Kcm ⊃ a
and
ael2(r) = Kb1 ∧ . . . ∧Kbk ∧ ¬Kc1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬Kcm ⊃ a
Embeddings ael1() and ael2() can be extended to logic
programs P .
Let B be a belief pair. Define the projection, Proj(B),
as the 3-valued interpretation I such that I(p) =
HB(K(p)).
It turns out that fixpoints of the operator Dael1(P )
(Dael2(P ), respectively) precisely correspond to 3-valued
stable (supported, respectively) models of P (the pro-
jection function Proj(·) establishes the correspondence).
Moreover, complete fixpoints of Dael1(P ) describe 2-
valued stable (supported, respectively) models of P . Fi-
nally, the least fixpoint of Dael2(P ) captures the Fitting-
Kunen 3-valued semantics of a program P , and the least
fixpoint of Dael1(P ) captures the well-founded semantics
of P .
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